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2Introduction 
The Christmas Carol is Charles Dickens’ story about the spiritual conversion of Ebenezer 
Scrooge. The story begins with the miser Scrooge niggardly guarding his wealth; 
however, as the story develops he encounters a series of spirits who show him the impact 
of his approach. The happy ending results when Scrooge sees the harm of his wealth 
maximizing ways and broadens opening his range of concern to include a benefit to his 
clerk’s crippled son, Tiny Tim.  In its essence, The Christmas Carol is an illustration of 
the shareholder-stakeholder debate, and that debate is one of the debates at the heart of 
corporate governance.1
S. Bottomley observes “‘Corporate Governance’…is a slippery term: it is used both in 
discussions about the role of companies in society … and also in discussion about the 
1
 Farrar writes somewhat reflectively, “…corporate governance is about the legitimacy of corporate power, 
corporate accountability, and the standards by which the corporation is to be governed, and by who, it is 
obvious that the concept transcends legal standards and liability, perhaps reflecting the fact that the law 
deals with minimal morality of obligation rather than a morality of aspiration.  Corporate governance is 
often about the method as opposed to the substance of corporate decision-making.  Nevertheless it seems 
too narrow to limit it exclusively to questions of method and good house keeping.” J. Farrar, Corporate 
Governance in Australia and New Zealand, Melbourne, Oxford University Press, (2002), at p. 431 
(hereinafter CG).  The complexity and broad scope of corporate governance is well canvassed in S. 
Turnbull, “Corporate Governance: Its Scope, concerns and theories.” (October, 1997) 5 Corporate 
Governance, (4) pp. 193-196
3organization of affairs within companies.” 2  It is this author’s position that answers to the 
latter depend on answers to the former and therefore corporate governance must include 
both.  Essentially, corporate governance asks and attempts to answer four questions:  
what is the entity being governed?3  By whom it should be governed? What is the best 
way to govern it?   And in whose interests should the entity be governed?  The 
shareholder-stakeholder debate is one way of framing these problems and providing a 
series answers. 
The shareholder-stakeholder debate itself can be analyzed along a number of different 
lines.  At a most basic level it can be analysed as a discussion between monotonic and 
pluralistic approaches to corporations—is the corporation a vehicle for shareholder 
wealth or an instrument of a broader societal constituency?4  It can be analyzed along 
cultural lines as in Anglo vs. Continental vs. Asian models.5  It can be analyzed along the 
2
 S. Bottomley “From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance” 
(1997) Sydney LR at p. 277 (hereinafter From Contractualism).
3
 Assuming for the moment, contrary to nexus of contract theorists, that there is an entity to be governed.
4
 T. Dunfee, “Corporate Governance in a Market with Morality,” 62 Law and Contemporary Problems, 
Duke University Law School, 129-158, Summer, 1999. 
5
 See for example, A. Kakabadse and N. Kakabadse, The Geopolitics of Governance: The Impact of 
Contrasting Philosophies. Basingstoke: Pagrave, 2001.  Path dependence theories cited by J. Hill, 
“Introduction: Comparative Corporate Governance and Takeovers” Sydney LR Vol. 24:319, p. 320, n. 7.  
See L. Bebchuk and M. Roe “A Theory of Path Convergence in corporate ownership and governance” 
(Nov. 1999) 52 Stanford Law Review il, p. 127, Farrar, CG p. 7, n. 2 and Chap. 2 generally. A. Corfield, 
“The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance: A Preliminary Analysis.” 
(1998) 10 Bond LR at p. 232, A. Gamble and G. Kelly, “Stakeholder Capitalism: Limits and 
4lines of business management vs. legal obligations.6  It can be analyzed with a number of 
insider and outsider models.  One such model is as members of the corporate entity vs. 
non-members.7  Another insider-outsider model sets the question as corporation vs. 
community.8 Still further, the stakeholder debate can be analyzed along the lines of 
economic thinking.9
The shareholder-stakeholder debate in corporate governance has been going on for 
decades increasing in pitch as globalization has increased10 and corporate scandals of 
Opportunities.”  At p. 7.  For the contrary view, that corporate governance is converging and essentially 
over, see H. Hansmann and R. Kraakman “The End of History for Corporate Law”, (2000) New York 
University Centre for Law and Business, Working Paper #CLB-99-013 and Farrar’s second last line in CG 
“This is not the end of history of corporate governance.” P. 472
7
 C. Mayer, “Stock Markets: Financial Institutions and Corporate Performance” , in N. Dimsdale and M. 
Preveser (eds). Capital Markets and Corporate “Governance. Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1994), p. 179 cited 
in Farrar, CG, p. 417.
8
 D. Korten. When Corporations Rule the World, 2 ed. New York: Kumarian Press. (2001), J. Dine, The 
Governance of Corporate Groups. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (2000) (hereinafter GCG) 
Chap. 4., C. Weir, D. Laing and P. McKnight. “Internal and External Governance Mechanisms: Their 
Impact on the Performance of Large UK Public Companies.” (June/July 2002) Journal of Business Finance 
& Accounting 29(5) & (6).
9
 R. Coase, “The Nature of the Firm,” (1937) 4 Economia (NS) 386. 
10
 See for example, Korten op cit. n. 6. 
5ever increasing size rock the not only the investment community, but society at large.11
For some it is the critical debate as will be seen below,12 while others dismiss it a 
“bogus”.13  This paper will analyze the debate, particularly looking at the legal arguments 
and assumptions behind the positions taken by the two camps, the models of corporations 
involved, normative issues corporate law and the implications for corporate governance.
HISTORY OF THE SHAREHOLDER-STAKEHOLDER 
DEBATE
The debate can be traced back to Berle and Dodd’s articles in the Harvard Law Review of 
the 1930’s. The debate took place against the backdrop of the 1929 stockmarket crash 
11
 “These reexaminations are usually triggered by a dramatic event or series of events and are initiated by 
some of those involved in the events whose interests in dealing with those events would be served by 
changing the rules. And generally others involved in those events see their interests served by preserving 
the rules that have historically guided people.”  A. Sommer, “Whom Should the Corporation Serve? The 
Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years Later,” (Winter 1991) 16 Del. J. Corp. L. 33, p. 33. See public 
calls for and efforts to improve corporate governance in post-Enron times such as Sorbanes-Oxley Act in 
the USA.
12
 Millon sees it as a “crisis” in corporate law. P. 1377 Dine citing Sullivan and Conlon who refer to a 
change from contract to constituency models—i.e. shareholder to stakeholder—of corporations as having 
“created a crisis in corporate governance.” GCG, p. 35.
13
 P. Goldenberg, “Shareholders v Stakeholders: the Bogus Argument” (1998), 19 (2) Company Lawyer 34, 
p. 36 cited in A. Reynolds, “Do ESOPS Strengthen Employee Stakeholder Interests?” (2001) 13 Bond LR 
p. 97, n. 18.
6which prompted a deep suspicion in Americans about the corporations in their midst.14
Berle took the view that managers only need consider the views of shareholders.  Dodd 
took the view that although the law supported Berle’s view, the concerns of workers 
should be included.15  The debate has gone in both directions at different times in the 
intervening years16 and as will be seen below continues to the present.17
14
 Sommer, op cit at p. 36.
15
 “Professor Dodd said that: [this writer] believes that public opinion, which ultimately makes law, has 
made and is today making substantial strides in the direction of a view of the business corporation as an 
economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit--making function, that this view has 
already had some effect upon legal theory, and that it is likely to have a greatly increased effect upon the 
latter in the near future. In response, Professor Berle said: "Now I submit that you can not [sic] abandon 
emphasis on 'the view that business corporations exist for the sole purpose of making profits for their 
stockholders' until such time as you are prepared to offer a clear and reasonably enforceable scheme of 
responsibilities to someone else." Professor Berle finished his analysis with this summary: Unchecked by 
present legal balances, a social--economic absolutism of corporate administrators, even if benevolent,
might be unsafe; and in any case it hardly affords the soundest base on which to construct the economic 
commonwealth which industrialism seems to require. Meanwhile, as lawyers, we had best be protecting the 
interests we know, being no less swift to provide for the new interests as they successively appear.” Quoted 
in ibid, p. 37.
Generally, see J. Weiner, “The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation” (1964) 64 
Columbia Law Review 1458. cited in Reynolds, op cit at p. 96.
16
 Berle conceded that Dodd was gaining a greater following in his book, The 20th Century Capitalist 
Revolution, 1954, cited in L. Stout “Bad and not-so-bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy” (2002) 
Southern Calif. LR (75) 1189, at p. 1193.; however, W. Beaver’s article laments that it seems stakeholder 
theory is finished. “Is the Stakeholder model dead?”  (March-Apr. 1999) Business Horizons,  42 (12) p. 8.
17 Brief outline of the debate offered in D. Millon, “Communitarians, Contractarians, and the Crisis in 
Corporate Law,”  (1993) 50 Washington and Lee LR 1373 (hereinafter Communitarians). The triumphalist 
7One fundamental issue is who should be included as a stakeholder?  At one end of the 
spectrum are some scholars (and investors) who argue that the only stakeholder to be 
considered is the shareholder. At the other end of the spectrum are those scholars who 
would include even the most inanimate objects in the physical environment.18 One 
generally accepted definition of stakeholder is R. Freeman’s who wrote: “A stakeholder 
is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the 
rhetoric of the shareholder primacy theorists is surprising.  Consider, for example, the statement by 
commentators Hansmann and Kraakman:
The triumph of the shareholder-oriented model of the corporation over its principal competitors is 
now assured, even if it was problematic as recently as twenty-five years ago. Logic alone did not 
establish the superiority of this standard model or of the prescriptive rules that it implies, which 
establish a strong corporate management with duties to serve the interests of shareholders alone, 
and strong minority shareholder protections. Rather, the standard model earned its position as the 
dominant model of the large corporation the hard way, by out-competing during the post-World-
War-II period the three alternative models of corporate governance: the managerialist model, the 
labor-oriented model, and the state-oriented model.
This rhetoric is reiterated by Jensen and others and is hard to explain given the lack of consensus among 
economists, legal, and business scholars on the issue. By way of contrast note Millon’s observation “ The  
longstanding shareholder primacy norm is on very shaky ground, Communitarians, p. 1376. Probably the 
best analysis of the situation is Millon’s comment “our society never has committed itself, and never will, 
to relentless shareholder wealth maximization and its attendant social costs” and that “neither position is on 
the verge of triumph.” Ibid.
18
 E. Sternberg, “The Defects of Stakeholder Theory,” Corp. Gov. Vol 5(1) p. 4.
8organization’s objectives.”19 In essence then the stakeholder model suggests that a 
corporation should be governed by the people affected by the acts and decisions of the 
corporation and this will be the meaning for proposes of this paper.  
These positions of shareholder and stakeholder reflect a number of different concerns.  
Scholars and business interests who favour the shareholder to the exclusion of all other 
stakeholder are “minimalist pure stakeholder”20 and whose belief in the Market and 
Adam Smith’s21 “Invisible Hand” is nearly religious.22  At the other extreme are scholars 
probably merit the supposedly pejorative epithet the pure capitalists hurl: “communist”.  
The stakeholder debate is further complicated by the stake in question.  Is it a matter of 
control, of voice, or merely being taken into consideration?  As business professor Gerald 
Vinten notes: “There is no such thing as a tradeable stakeholding certificate, and neither 
is there any direct legal requirement [to consider stakeholders].”23  Yet the lack of 
consensus on the stake in question certainly makes for a more muddled debate.
19
 Ibid., p. 31.
20
 D. Wood, “Whom should business serve?” (2002) 14 Aust. J. of Corp. Law commenting on Bruce 
Langtry’s theory.
21
 It is well known among scholars that Smith only refers to the invisible hand once in his The Wealth of 
Nations and it more moderate in his views than commonly presented by neoliberals. Wood, op cit p. 2, n. 3.
22
 See Harvard theologian, H. Cox’s  article, “The Market as God”, (March 1999) Atlantic Monthly,  p. 18-
23, J. Dine’s discussion of Cooter’s analysis of Coase Theorem, GCG, p. 111-113 and L. McQuaig.  All 
You Can Eat, (2001) Toronto: Penguin Books, discussion of the new capitalists view of Smith’s theories, 
pp. 241-2.
23
 Vinten, “The Stakeholder Manager,” (2000) 38 Management Decision (6) 377.
9Yet another dimension to the debate is introduced by economists who approach the 
debate from the perspective of efficiency some have challenged stakeholder theory on the 
basis that stakeholder laws or “constituency states” such as anti-takeover legislation and  
non-exclusive wealth maximizing create distortions in the market harming the efficiency 
of the market and reducing overall social wealth and hence the overall well-being of 
society.24  Other economists claim that stakeholder theory more accurately reflects the 
situation by having internalized more costs which current accounting principles 
inappropriately externalize.25
Another aspect to the debate is introduced when one examines the nature of the 
corporation and its consequent role in society.  Is the corporation merely a legal 
recognition afforded to a natural aggregation of business people, or is it a concession 
granted by government for the public good?   The former position is advocated by 
economists who as we shall see discuss the corporation in a nexus-of-contracts model.26
Lawyers, environmentalists and business ethicists among others looking at corporate 
legal history as a way of supporting broader social responsibility, advocate the latter 
24
 See M. Jensen, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function: (2001) 
7 European Financial Management  (3) 297, for example.
25
 B. Horrigan “Fault Lines in the Intersection between Corporate Governance and Social Responsibility,” 
UNSW LJ Vol 25(2), p. 515  and D. Wood, “Whom Should Business Serve?” (2002) 14 Australian Journal 
of Corporate Law 1-20.
26
 This concept was pioneered by Coase “Nature of the Firm” (1937) 4 Economia NS 386 cited in Farrar 
CG p. 30, n. 69.
10
position.  The legal aspect of the debate becomes more complex as one examines various 
legal concepts of corporate law arising from rulings such as Salomon v. Salomon & Co. 
Ltd.27 and even more so when one examines the normative issues of corporate law. 
Still further, the discussion takes on a different dimension when one examines the views 
of management theorists and practitioners who are concerned about the practical matters 
of profitability, accountability, and control.  These interests and concerns are intertwined 
with some of the interests and concerns of corporate lawyers.  The discussion in this area 
considers among other things, the best way to control the corporation, and generally 
frames the discussion in terms of internal or external forms of regulation.28
In dealing with the shareholder- stakeholder debate, yet another discussion comes into 
play.  That is: what is the role of government in dealing with corporations and the various 
interests they represent?  Is it to facilitate the market and the Invisible Hand as 
shareholders advocate, or is it to regulate corporations to promote the common good as 
stakeholders would have it?  
27
 [1897] AC 22, Farrar CG p. 28. 
28
 See for example, J. Dine, GCG, Chap. 4 “Theories and models of the regulation of corporations and 
groups.”
11
Clearly, the stakeholder debate is multi-faceted, multi-disciplinary, interconnected and in 
some aspects circular.29   Government, as the ultimate external control, needs direction 
from the public and from scholars on the nature, purpose and functioning of the 
corporation in order to develop appropriate systems to do its job of governing the nation.  
The role of government is made more complex by the influence of corporations, and of 
course, the debate on the proper role of government in the first place.  
STAKEHOLDER THEORY
Stakeholder Theory-Origins and History
As a previously noted, as a legal concern, stakeholder theory goes back to Dodd; 
however, stakeholder theory as a management concern can be traced back at least to 1963 
where it was used by the Stanford Research Institute in an internal memorandum on 
management to signify “those groups without whose support the organization would 
cease to exist.”30
Stakeholder theory answers the four questions as follows. (1) The corporation is a 
29
 In this paper the author will not distinguish between the various particularities of corporate law in Anglo 
jurisdictions because the fundamental concerns and issues are the same: the nature of the corporation and 
its role in society. 
30
 R.E Freeman, Strategic Planning: a Stakeholder Approach.  New York, Pitman Publishing, (1984), p. 32. 
12
concession from the government and an independent entity in itself.  (2) It should be 
governed by those affected by the decisions and actions of the corporation. (3) The best 
way to govern the corporation is by having decision making structures in place that 
permit those effected by the decisions at least voice, if not some control on the decisions 
made. And (4) the corporation should be governed in a way that promotes overall social 
good.
Stakeholder Theory – Assumptions And Criticism
Assumptions
Stakeholder theory fundamentally holds that the corporation is an entity that has profound 
effects on society.  On that basis those affected should have some confluence or control 
over the corporation.  It is based on fundamental legal principles and beliefs such as that 
one must bear responsibility for consequences of action, that economics and efficiency 
are not ultimate values, and voice in the distribution of cost and benefits of society 
resources.31
Criticism
Perhaps the champion of stakeholder critics is Elaine Sternberg.32  As the leading 
spokesperson opposing stakeholder theory, her arguments merit analysis.
31
 Referred to by Stokes as the democratic ideal, cited in Bottomley, From Contractarian op cit, p. 290
32
 M. Jensen, at p. 298, n. 2. Sternberg is a former investment banker turned philosopher.  She includes in 
her argument certain legal grounds for opposing stakeholder theory.  That she views stakeholder theory as 
some type of heretical cult as can be seen from the title of her article “Stakeholder Theory Exposed”.   It is 
interesting to note that few lawyers seem to oppose stakeholder theory—at least not on legal grounds.  
13
Sternberg’s criticism of stakeholder theory has four main thrusts.33  She argues: 
stakeholder theory is incompatible with business, stakeholder theory is incompatible with 
corporate governance, stakeholder theory of accountability is unjustified, and stakeholder 
theory undermines private property, agency and wealth.
Sternberg holds “stakeholder theory… wholly precludes the activity of business.”  She 
argues that business requires maximizing long-term owner value.  In contrast the 
balancing requirement of stakeholder theory precludes such favouritism that by definition 
obviates business.  She furthers her argument by claiming stakeholder theory is 
unworkable because the number of stakeholders is infinite and given all the competing 
interests the identification of what should be counted as a benefit is not identifiable.  She 
further argues that as stakeholder theory has no means of weighing or balancing the 
competing interests of various stakeholders this balancing task is impossible.  In essence 
this argument challenges the nature and purpose of corporations.
Sternberg next argues that stakeholder theory is incompatible with corporate governance.  
In her view, accountability of directors to shareholders is the central issue in corporate 
Perhaps this reflects an understanding that the law does not exist a priori, but follows from determined 
policy decisions, or alternatively, that law does have an inherent obligation of social justice.
33
 E. Sternberg, op cit.  Criticisms of stakeholder theory are generally variations on these same themes, 
whether the criticisms arise from legal scholars, economists, business theorists or others.  See for example, 
the paper by finance professor A. Sundaram and professor of management and strategy, A. Inkpen, “The 
Corporate Objective Revisited”, p. 20-21 unpublished paper available on Social Science Research Network 
at www.ssrn.com .
14
governance.  In contrast she notes: “an essential principle of stakeholder theory [is] that 
corporations should be equally accountable to all their stakeholders. [italics in 
original]”34  She attacks this position as “unjustified” and “unworkable.”  Clearly, if one 
accepts her view of accountability and corporate governance, she is correct. 
Concerning her third argument on accountability, Sternberg argues that stakeholder 
theory “gives full rein to arrogant and unresponsive management” and assists in 
exploitation of corporations by management by failing to provide a single clear criterion 
for judgment of performance.  She claims it requires management to reject the obligations 
to owners that they accepted in accepting their management jobs.  Sternberg argues: “As 
the property of its owners, a business is properly accountable only to them.”35
Finally, Sternberg claims that stakeholder theory undermines private property rights by 
denying owners of private property the right to deal with it as they choose.  If 
corporations for any reason act in the interests of anyone but the shareholders, 
corporations are converting and/or curtailing the private property rights of the owners.  
As Millon observes:
[stakeholder theorists] characterize the debate as a disagreement over whether it is 
appropriate to use mandatory rules to impeded shareholder wealth  maximization 
in order to benefit other corporate constituent groups or other affected interests 
outside the corporate enterprise.  For contractarians [shareholder theorists], such 
rules represent an unjust imposition on the liberty of shareholder to pursue their 
own interests.  They have made this point by criticizing communitarian 
34
 Ibid, p. 5.
35 Ibid, p. 6.  Sternberg also briefly addresses corporate performance, Kantian moral theory, parallels with 
government, and social contract arguments for extra-corporate accountability.  
15
[stakeholder] corporate law reform as the reallocation of wealth from shareholders 
to nonshareholders.36
Sternberg applies this same analysis to the law of principal and agent.  Again, Sternberg 
holds that the directors and managers of corporations are agents of the shareholders.  
Accordingly, stakeholder theory, which allows the former to act independently of or 
contrary to the wishes of shareholders it undermines the duty of the agent to the 
principal.37
She argues that these two pillars of law underlie the success of western economies and 
political liberties and accordingly should be protected by rejecting absolutely stakeholder 
theory.  Sternberg’s argument is that the law as it stands in support of capitalist, free 
market economies is correct and should be carefully guarded.  
Sternberg concludes her attack on stakeholder theory with ad hominem arguments that 
seem to characterize opponents of stakeholder theory.38  She opines: “stakeholder theory 
36
 Millon, Communitarians, at p. 1383-4.
37
 Indeed, as a Sommer observes: “it may be reasonably concluded that the legislature intended to do 
something common law did not do in affording directors flexibility in fending off a hostile tender offer –
namely, favor non--shareholders over shareholders.” Op cit p. 43
38
 See, for example, Jensen, op. cit. p. 306 who writes “Stakeholder theory gives them [socialists] the 
appearance of legitimate political access to the sources of decision making power.”  This personalizing of 
the debate is addressed by Millon who observes: “The ideology and psychological predispositions that turn 
many corporate law scholars away from these kinds of inquires explain the inability of at least some 
contractarians to acknowledge the crisis in corporate law,” Communitarians at p. 1388, in reference to the 
need to address social concerns in corporate law.
16
seems to offer a free lunch; it attracts those would like to enjoy the benefits of business 
without the discipline… [and] those with most to gain from avoiding accountability: 
business managers…. [and] promoters of worthy ‘causes’, who believe they would be the 
beneficiaries.”39  Perhaps this type of personal and emotional attack reflects the very deep 
and personal ideologies that underlie the debate, which shall be addressed later in this 
paper.
Sternberg’s argument is that stakeholder theory is fundamentally flawed because it does 
not make directors responsible to owners.  This is the classic Berle and Means agency 
problem.  Her concern is that the agents will act exclusively in their own self-interest.  As 
Sternberg sees it, directors cannot be or have any true accountability unless it is directly 
and exclusively to shareholder. Empirical studies of self-interest in management action
and decision making suggest that Sternberg is being driven by ideology more than 
evidence.  Studies indicate that managerial motivation is far more complex including 
aspects of altruistically motivated behaviour along with self-interested behaviour.
Sternberg’s criticisms are by no means an exhaustive list of the criticisms of stakeholder 
theory; however they are both representative of general issues and address the main 
concerns.40
39
 Ibid. pp. 8-9.
40
 See for e.g. Sundaram and Inkfield who identify five and Corfield who identifies eight.  These criticisms 
are broadly addressed by the four raised by Sternberg.
17
Replies To Stakeholder Criticism41
Stakeholder critics have some trenchant criticisms of the theory.  The strength of these 
criticisms revolves primarily around the above noted issues of accountability and 
currently existing legal norms.  We shall now turn our attention to individual replies to 
each of these criticisms.  First, is it correct to say that stakeholder theory is contrary to 
business?  
For stakeholder theory to be against business, one must accept a certain definition of 
business, and more particularly, a certain theory of the corporation.  If the corporation is, 
as economists argue, a nexus-of-contracts, then there may be some credence to the 
argument.  But one must further accept that the appropriate and exclusive object of 
business is the increase of wealth for the owners of the business. In addition, one must 
also exclude the wealth of any other party including the general social benefit as being of 
interest or importance.42  Furthermore, as will be discussed in greater depth, it is not at all 
clear that long-term stockholder interest should have priority over short-term stockholder 
41
 For a business reply to Sternberg’s four objections, see G. Vinten, op cit.
42
 Later in this paper we will take up the challenge that the increasingly unequal distribution of wealth 
creates for those who argue that overall wealth increases the social wealth of a country.  See, for example, 
Jenson, p.  302-304, and the contrary views by S. Bottomley, “Taking Corporations Seriously: Some 
Considerations for Corporate Regulation” in (1990) 19 Federal Law Review, pl. 204,  and R. Dworkin, “Is 
Wealth a Value?” in (1980) 9 Journal of Legal Studies, p. 191, cited by J. Dine “Risks and Systems: A New 
Approach to Corporate Governance and the European Employee Consultation Structures?”  (2001) 3 
International and Comp. Corp. LJ 2 p. 302, n. 11.
18
interest, nor yet that shareholder are  “owners” and have a unique or special position in 
the corporation
Clearly, these assumptions are suspect.  Farrar, for example, laments about “the 
unsatisfactory state of affairs” in his authoritative analysis of the corporation,43 H.L.A. 
Hart observes that none of the theories of the corporation adequately explain the 
phenomenon.44  Theories of the corporations include sociological, economic, and legal.  
One can further analyze the corporation in terms of culture, power, politics and 
cybernetics.45  Farrar outlines the mutations of the idea of the corporation and its 
purposes over time and states that this too adds to the uncertainty in the proper 
identification of the nature and purposes of the corporation.46 Accordingly, without any 
consensus concerning a foundational understanding of the corporation or its purpose, it is 
difficult to see how Sternberg’s criticism can stand.  Stakeholder theory is merely outside 
of Sternberg’s paradigm for the corporation.
43
 J. Farrar, “Frankenstein Incorporated or Fool’s Parliament? Revisiting the Concept of the Corporation in 
Corporate Governance” (1998) 10 Bond LR at p. 161 (hereinafter Frankenstein).
44
 E. Orts “The Complexity And Legitimacy Of Corporate Law” (Fall, 1993) 50 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1565  
p. 1623 P. 3
45
 See for example the discussion in Turnbull, op cit, pp. 193-196
46
 Ibid, pp. 144-45.
19
Sternberg’s next criticism, that stakeholder theory is contrary to corporate governance is 
based on the issue of accountability. 47   To be equally accountable to all she argues is to 
be accountable to none. This argument is a straw-man argument.  Stakeholder theory, to 
the extent that one can speak of unanimity of views, does not advocate equality of all 
interests—or the view this extreme position implies: the rejection of the profit motive.48
Judges daily and legislatures regularly balance conflicting interests examining by policy 
objectives among other things.49
 In fact as noted by Prof. Henry Hu corporate directors already do just that.50  These 
answers, however, are not to denigrate the seriousness of the criticism.  Stakeholder 
theory does have a considerable challenge to address when it comes to the issues of how 
and to whom the corporation should be accountable. Alternative answers lie in corporate 
governance structures in non-Anglo corporations.  For example, the German two tiered 
board that permits employees a strong voice in decision-making, or the Japanese model 
that permits a tripartite objective for the corporation.51  Other more Anglo solutions lie as 
47
 Jensen ibid argues that from a management perspective, stakeholder theory is impossible because it 
requires management to consider more than one interest. P. 300 ff.
48
 Dunfee op. cit, n. 2 at p. 131.
49
 See, for example, Richard Posner’s life work on economics as the policy driving law.
50
 H. Hu, “Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment”, (1994) 38 UCLA L. Rev. 277 
cited in Orts, op cit. 
51
 Noted in Horrigan, op cit at p. 542 writes “Japanese communitarian capitalism… [has] three intertwined 
strands of the common good—i.e. the pursuit of happiness and prosperity, the concern for justice and 
fairness, and the affirmation and importance of community.”
20
Horrigan also notes in the “Triple Bottom Line” idea—i.e. profit, environmental 
protection and social good—which seems to be gaining some acceptance, at least in 
Australia.52
The must fundamental legal challenge to stakeholder theory comes from Sternberg’s 
criticisms concerning of property and agency law.  This criticism goes back to the Berle
and Dodd debate in which Berle cautioned against stakeholder view: “it requires little 
analysis to make place the fact that private property as understood in the capitalist system 
is rapidly losing its original characteristics.”53  If one accepts, however, that all rights 
except the right to life,54 are circumscribed, that no rights are absolute, then there is no 
reason the right to private property should be any different.  The law does in fact 
recognize many limitations on private property rights.  For example, the law recognizes 
the state’s right to appropriate land, or to prohibit the ownership of another human being, 
and where and how one may drive one’s car.  Furthermore, if one accepts that the 
corporation is not the property of stakeholder but an independent entity in which 
stakeholder have but three rights, voting, dividends and residue, the criticism from 
property and agency law do not stand.  Sternberg’s view of law is a naïve view of law.  
She appears to presume that law in some manner is a priori and has followed a logical 
non-ideological path.  It is generally recognized that law is the product of its particular 
52
 Ibid, pp. 543 ff. 
53
 A. Berle and G. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1932)  Cited in D. Millon, 
“Frontiers of Legal Thought: Theories of the Corporation” (1990) Duke Law Journal, 201 at 222 
(hereinafter Frontiers).
54
 USA capital punishment
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times,55 certain styles of thinking, by a limited group of people, usually a propertied, 
privileged class with less concern for those without.56
SHAREHOLDER THEORY
To avoid a straw-man argument, as Sternberg created in her criticism of stakeholder 
theory, the discussion of “shareholder theory” must start with a caveat.  In all but its most 
extreme versions, shareholder theory does not require that every other party be ignored 
and every possible action to advance profit be acted.57  Rather, it requires that primacy be 
given to the shareholder, and accordingly in the USA legal literature at least, is referred 
to as “shareholder primacy.”  Shareholder primacy sees the corporation’s objective as 
maximizing shareholder wealth.  Business scholars refer to this wealth maximization as 
the “corporate objective function.”58  Although shareholders can be viewed or 
55
 As Sommers observes: “the truth is that its content is constantly shifting, and notwithstanding the best 
efforts of justices to link their present decision making with the past in an effort to make it appear that 
nothing has changed, the truth is that change has occurred.” Op cit p. 33.
56
 To demonstrate the equality of the law it has been said “The law equally prohibits the rich and the poor 
from sleeping under bridges.”
57
 Shareholder theory does not, for example, require a corporation to hire “a hitman to murder the key 
witness against the firm in a major product liability case.” Dunfee, op. cit. 10.
58
 See for example, the title of Jensen’s  article, “Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the 
Corporate Objective Function”, op cit.
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characterized in a number of different ways,59 for purposes of this debate, the view that 
most accurately represents the situation under discussion is the shareholder-as-investor 
view.
Shareholder theorists answer the four questions of corporate governance as follows.  (1) 
There is no entity to be governed: it is a mere collection of contracts the terms of which 
govern the actions of the individuals involved. (2) Given the separation of owners from 
mangers, it should be governed by shareholder appointees—directors.  (3) The best way 
to govern the corporation is by a board of directors elected by and accountable to the 
shareholders.  And (4) the corporation should be governed for shareholder wealth 
maximization.
Shareholder Theory--Origins and History
From the perspective of legal theory, one could argue that historically the primacy of 
shareholder rights arises from doctrines of private property.  John Locke argued that 
private property is carved out of the common property by the labour a person puts into it: 
59
 See J. Hill,  “Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder” (Winter, 2000) 48 Am. J. Comp. L. 39 who 
identifies seven models or views of shareholders: owner/principal, beneficiary, bystander, participant in a 
political entity, investor, Cerberus, and managerial partners.
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“It hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes the common right.”60  In 
other words, by the direct connection of one’s hands and the physical article one had an 
ownership right—the right to exclusive use.61  As Mr. Justice Wilson wrote in the 1766 
property case concerning landowners denial of gleaning rights to commoners: “the soil is 
his, the seed is his and in natural justice his also is the profit.”62  This view of private 
property rights lent credence to the argument that the rights of ownership of capital led to 
rights to manage the enterprise.  This view provided a stronger argument at a time when 
capital and management were more closely linked.63  In corporate law, one finds that the 
shareholders were historically those who invested their private property, money, into a 
common fund such as a joint stock company with a view to a profit.64
Changes in corporate law, however, increased the separation between owners of  
financial capital and in the income generating assets of the business.  In the USA with 
Santa Clara County vs. South Pacific Railroad 65 and in the UK with Salomon vs. 
60 Second Treatise on Government  II v. 33  general theory of private property discussed Uzgalis, William, 
"John Locke", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), 
forthcoming URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2003/entries/locke/
61
 Interestingly, Locke use the example of the activity of one’s servant without explaining how that person 
become a servant in the first place.
62
 E.P Thompson, Customs in Common. New York: The Free Press, (1991), cited in McQuaig, p. 209.
63
 See discussion in J. Dine, GCG, p. 6.  Note J. Hill, who suggests that such closeness of shareholder and 
management in earlier times could be “another myth of corporate law.”  See also Adam Smith’s comments 
on passive, uninterested, uninvolved inventors, cited in Wood p.10
64
 Farrar CG, p. 158
65
 118 U.S. 394 (1886)
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Salomon & Co. Ltd.66 the courts gave the corporation an independent personality.  This 
personality existed and held property and liability in this own right with complete 
independence from the shareholders and other members of the corporate entity.  This 
change in the law permitted management to ignore the broader concerns of the general 
commercial environment, which would include such parties as creditors and employees, 
and to the narrow focus on the interests of the “owner” shareholders.67
Prior to these court decisions, corporations did not have independent legal personality, 
and hence were not able to sustain a legal action independently of the shareholders.  Nor 
was limited liability a feature of corporations until 1855.68  With the combined benefits of 
independent legal personality and limited liability, it was no longer necessary for 
shareholders to consider any other interests.  There was no greater personal financial risk 
in refusing to consider other interests than the risk already accepted by making the 
investment in the corporation in the first place.  As a result, people could become 
investors, carefree of corporate action and its consequences, except for return on 
capital.69 While this phenomena is neither new nor unexpected—it was anticipated by 
Smith and Marx70—it carries with it certain problems, and particularly the agency 
problem, and for some, a moral problem.71 As Wood notes:
66
 [1897] AC 22
67
 Farrar, CG p. 22
68
 Dine, GCG p. 5 offers 1844 as the date of incorporation by registration and 1855 as the date of limited 
liability. Farrar CG p. 9 offers 1844 that the UK’s Companies Act first conferred limited liability.
69
 Farrar, CG, p. 11.
70
 Noted in Farrar, CG, p. 11 n. 40 and n. 37.
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Berle and Means point out that having ‘surrendered control and responsibility’ 
over corporate assets, shareholders had ‘surrendered the right that the corporation 
should be operated in their sole interest’ and ‘released the community from the 
obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the strict doctrine of
property rights’.72
Over time, corporate law came to reflect this single focal point73 and increased the focus 
on director accountability to shareholders.  Hill argues that the trade-off of control was 
made at the same time that the courts moved the focus of corporate law to the 
maximization of shareholder wealth.74  In other words, the agency problem that was 
created by the separation of ownership and management was at the same time resolved by 
the fiduciary nature of the duties placed on management.75
Although shareholder primacy was developed by USA courts in the 1830’s in terms of 
receiving of dividends and voting,76 the view of shareholder wealth being the focus of the 
71 Indeed, passive investing may be looked upon as a morally questionable activity, dividends being quite 
undeserved. Adam Smith expressed very little concern for such an investor. He castigated what he referred 
to as ‘proprietors’ of joint stock companies, for they: “seldom pretend to understand any thing of the 
business of the company; and when the spirit of faction happens not to avail among them, give themselves 
no trouble about it, but receive contentedly such half yearly or yearly dividend, as the directors think proper 
to make to them.”  Wood, p. 11, quoting Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations.
72
 Wood, p. 12.
73
 See Millon detailed discussion of the history of corporate development, Frontiers pp. 205-240.
74
 Hill, Visions at p. 7
75
 Fiduciary duties are placed on directors not managers, but the term “management” is used to keep 
linguistic symmetry and emphasize the idea of operators versus owners.
76
 D. Smith. “The Shareholder Primacy Norm”, (Winter 1998) 23 The J. of Corp. L 2 p. 279 at p. 296.
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corporate enterprise was pronounced by the courts in 1919 case of Dodge v. Ford Motor 
Co.77   As stated in that case, “A business corporation is organized and carried on 
primarily for the profit of the stockholders.  The powers of the directors are to be 
employed for that end.”  Managers have followed that lead78 and generally welcomed this 
focus as it simplified their responsibility and tied their success to clearly and easily 
measurable outcomes.79  In regulating corporations more recently, however, some 
governments have opened the earlier narrow laws that precluded non-shareholder 
interests.80  In doing so, the hope was that corporations and specifically directors would 
consider other interests of the broader community or social development concerns.81
77
 170 N.W. at 684 cited in Smith, op cit.
78
 S. Bainbidge, “Participatory Management Within a Theory of the Firm” (1996) 21 J. Corp. L 657-71 
cited in D. Smith, ibid.  Note that Smith argues the contrary: in his view, shareholder wealth maximization 
is not and has not been the norm in corporate law.  Nevertheless, Smith acknowledges that the consensus is 
the shareholder primacy norm.
79
 Dean Clark describes the practical argument for this perspective: A single, objective goal like profit 
maximization is more easily monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and reasonable 
accommodation of all affected interests.... Better monitoring means that corporate managers will be kept 
more accountable. They are more likely to do what they are supposed to do, and do it efficiently.
Quoted in Orts, n. 204.
80
 For example, in the USA 30 states have enacted laws permitting directors to consider stakeholders 
Millon, New Directions, p. 1375. E. Ortis “Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Constituency Statutes,” 
(1992) The George Wash. L R, 61,1 pp. 14- 135 (in Sternberg)
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 It appears, however, that this broadened ambit has been used primarily, if not exclusively, in the 
development of anti-takeover strategies, and not the true interests of the community at large. Corfield, op 
cit p. 230.
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As such, pursuit of non-shareholder interests—i.e. stakeholder interests—in the 
shareholder view amounts to a tax or misuse of the private property of the shareholders.82
In summary the main idea here is that as the parties who put up the money for the 
enterprise, the shareholders should have the right to be the sole concern of and have the 
right to control the enterprise.  From the management perspective, current proponents of 
shareholder primacy, such as Jensen, argue, “value maximization says that managers 
should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run market value of the firm.”83
The other main argument for shareholder primacy comes from the legal foundation of the 
corporation.  Corporations are founded by one or more people contributing a fund of 
capital for the purpose of carrying on a business with a view to making a profit.  These 
founding contributors are the shareholders.  As founders of an entity, the corporation, 
shareholders have the right to control the entity.
Shareholder Theory – Assumptions And Criticism
82
 M. Friedman, “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits”, Sept. 13, 1970, New 
York Times Magazine, at 32-33, 122, 124, 126 cited in Millon, Frontiers, p. 227-8. 
83
 P. 299 Jensen adds that the long-term interests of the corporation include “equity, debt, preferred stock 
and warrants.” Interestingly, for purposes of the legal debate on stakeholder theory, Jensen would be 
included with the stakeholders. Dunfee, p. 3 “stakeholders (variously, bondholders, suppliers, distributors, 
creditors, local communities, users….”)
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Most recently, shareholder primacy was brought into focus by the views of the 
economist, Milton Friedman.  In his highly controversial article, “The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits”84 Friedman argued that the social 
good achieved by a corporation is to producing a profit.85  He wrote: “the one and only 
one social responsibility of business—to use its resources and engage in activities 
designed to increase its profits so long as it… engages in open and free competition, 
without deception or fraud.”86   And, “Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the 
very foundations of our free society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social 
responsibility other than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible.”87
Friedman and other profit maximization theorists88 make social welfare the ultimate 
justification for the exclusive focus on profit.  In other words, the good end—social 
benefit—will be achieved by ignoring it and in fact focusing exclusively on another 
84
 Friedman, op cit.
85
 Millon points out that Friedman was well aware “that profit seeking can generate externalities, and that 
various members of the public may be affected adversely.  The question for Friedman was how such 
problems ought to be addressed, and he took for granted that a government accountable to the public, rather 
than private initiatives undertaking in the boardroom, should make the necessary cost-benefit decisions.” in 
“The Ambiguous Significance of Corporate Personhood”, (Jan 2001) Wash & Lee Pub. Law and Legal 
Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 01-6. (hereinafter The Ambiguous) at p. 20.
86
 M. Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (1962) 133 showing the development of the view before become 
famous in the NY Times article.
87
 Ibid.,
88
 See for example, Jensen, p. 302 “value maximization is an important one because it leads… to the 
maximisation of social welfare.”
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end—shareholder wealth maximization.89    As Hansmann and Kraakman, the authors of 
the influential “The End of History for Corporate Law” write:
The point is simply that now, as a consequence of both logic and experience, there 
is a convergence on a consensus that the best means to this end—the pursuit of 
aggregate social welfare—is to make corporate mangers strongly accountable to 
shareholder interests, and… only to those interests.90
This social benefit therefore becomes the justification for shareholder primacy.
It should be asked, therefore, whether this has in fact occurred.  Economic studies do not 
support this contention.  What can be said is that in the United States as shareholder 
primacy has advanced over the last 30 years is that there has been an increased 
concentration of wealth.  One finds a growing disparity between rich and poor and 
decline in the wealth of the middle class.91  Indeed, World Bank and IMF92 structural 
89
 This position shows either a remarkable faith in free market economics or a Zen approach to social 
justice.
90
  Op cit. n. 3 p. 10.  View reflected in Jensen who writes that value maximization “has its roots in 200 
years of research.” P. 299.
91
 See for example, David Cay Johnston who reports “The 400 wealthiest taxpayers accounted for more 
than 1 percent of all the income in the United States in the year 2000, more than double their share just 
eight years earlier,” in “Very Richest’s Share of Income Grew Even Bigger, Data Show” New York Times 
article, June 26, 2003.
 Clearly, there are many reasons for such disparities such as government policies, performance of the 
economy and changes in the labour force resulting from globalization, but the disparity noted parallels the 
shift away from stakeholder thinking and seems to suggest that shareholder primacy cannot be supported 
along these lines.  See Millon, Frontiers, p.229-230 on the triumph of shareholder primacy in this era. And  
McQuaig, op cit, pp. 96-107.
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adjustment programs, an integral part of which have been to open borders to shareholder 
primacy corporations, have been a failure in increasing general social wealth or widely 
distributing the benefits of corporate activity.93  The activities of these transnational 
corporations seem to do the opposite: they increase the concentration of wealth and 
increase the disparity between the rich and the poor.94 Accordingly, shareholder primacy 
as a general principal or a specific mechanism cannot be supported on the basis that it 
benefits society overall.
Four further reasons, however, are advocated by contemporary law and economics 
scholars.  Hill notes that these scholars claim that shareholders should have primacy 
because: (1) they hold the residual claims, (2) have the greatest risk, (3) the greatest 
incentive to maximize firm value and (4) the least protection.95  In her analysis of 
corporate finance, however, we find a very different reality to which we will now turn.
As to the first claim, concerning the residual claim, L. Stout observes that, the only time 
shareholders actually have the actual residual claim is when the corporation is in 
bankruptcy or being wound-up.96  Accordingly, to argue that shareholders deserve to 
92
 See, for example, McQuaig’s discussion of Joseph Stiglitz, former chief economist at the World Bank, in 
ibid pp. 82-92.
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 See Dine, GCG, Chap. 5 and extensive notes therein. 
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 Ibid., p. 151 and Wood, p. 11 n. 46.
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96
 op cit at p.  1193.
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have their interests as the foremost consideration on the basis of their right to the residual 
claim is hardly compelling.97
The second argument concerning risk is also challengeable.  With respect to publicly 
traded corporations there is a highly liquid market for shares and at practically any point, 
should the shareholder deem the risk unacceptable, the shareholdings can easily be sold. 
Furthermore, in contrast to other stakeholders, such as employees who for example bear 
the risk of unemployment and who lack the their general in ability to “withdraw their 
investment”, shareholders appear to have a lesser risk.98
Furthermore, shareholder primacy advocates argue the risk shareholders take as equity 
investors is significantly different and greater than other capital providers. This argument 
is premised on a clear distinction between debt and equity.  Hill demonstrates, that this 
distinction in contemporary corporations is very hard to maintain. She writes: “with the 
rise of more complex funding instruments the traditional distinction between debt and 
equity fails to accord with economic reality and looks artificial, arbitrary and increasingly 
passé.”99  She notes that the disaggregation of equity investments, dividing the risk and 
control components, makes the notion of shareholder as risk bearer and residual claimant 
97
 Farrar suggests this residual claim is the basis of their right to vote. CG, p. 158, and citation in n. 6.
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 Hill, Public Beginnings, Private Ends—should Corporate Law Privilege the Interests of Shareholders?” 
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much less compelling.  In fact, Hill argues, at times the courts are more likely to consider 
the interests of other financiers ahead of shareholders—the corporation’s success or 
failure being a thing independent of any particular interest group.100
Hill also notes the long term involvement of some lenders who end up having much more 
at stake than shareholders who can easily exit a precarious financial situation.  She notes 
the controlling positions some of these lenders take, not only in securing their funds, but 
also in the operations of the corporations becoming more like insiders than the traditional 
outsider role of creditors.  This situation, which she argues is the corporate reality, does 
not jibe with the shareholder primacy model advocated by shareholder primacy 
theorists.101  The point is pressed further by Stout who notes that even in a closely held 
corporation, once the corporation has assumed debt, the creditor has a greater right of 
“ownership” to the cash flow of the corporation than the shareholder.102  It is fair to say 
therefore, shareholders are merely one group of financiers whose characteristics do not fit 
the description set out by the law and economics scholars.103
100
 In such instances the courts turn to the notion of the best interest of the corporation. See discussion of 
this concept in Sommer pp. 46-51 and mentioned by Bottomley, From Contract p. 284
101
 Ibid. p. 5
102
 She notes that shareholders have a first claim on profits.  They only have a claim on profits when the 
corporation is (a) profitable and (b) the directors declare a dividend. Op. cit p. 1192. 
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 In his criticism of Salomon, Farrar notes: “[It] tipped the balance too far in favour of the equity investor 
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The third argument supporting shareholder primacy on the basis that they have the 
greatest incentive to see the corporation profit suffers its own weakness.  While 
shareholders may be eager to see the value of the corporation maximized there are 
certainly others with the same interest.  These would include such groups as employees 
seeking job security, directors and managers whose income may be directly tried to this 
measure, (and who lack the diversified portfolio common to shareholders) have a grater 
interest in seeing maximization than shareholders.  Further, this position ignores the 
diversity among shareholder interest, and in particular such parties as those parties taking 
a short position on the shares.
Furthermore, profit and wealth are arbitrary abstractions that hold no innate value 
commanding a privileged position.  As Wood observes:
there is no ‘prima facie’ moral, as opposed to prudential, reason, why profit 
should be promoted, let alone maximized. Profit is a mere accounting concept,
and profit-maximisation is at most a highly artificial goal. Profit is certainly not in 
its own right a ‘morally important social value’ such as: ‘the protection of the 
environment, the advancement of knowledge, the development of culture, the 
promotion of social prosperity, the fostering of community, and the protection of 
public health.’
Again, one is turned to the objective of shareholder wealth maximization as the objective 
of corporate activity, and when contrasted with other valuable objectives, the shareholder 
primacy model comes up lacking.104
104
 Wood, p. 10.  P. Dalley supports the shareholder primacy argument from a sociological analysis of 
groups.  She argues that corporations as purposive groups can include only shareholders because only their 
interests conform with those of the corporate group, with each shareholder determined to increase corporate 
profitability.  This conclusion seems odd because not only do shareholders doing nothing to increase 
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Further, this argument assumes an alignment of corporate interests and shareholder 
interests, as well as identifying corporate profit with shareholder wealth.  As will be seen 
later in the discussion, neither of these assumptions is tenable.
The fourth argument put forward for shareholder primacy is that they are in the most 
vulnerable, least protected position.  In addition to the replies to the previous three 
arguments, which equally apply to this contention, it is simply not the case.  Shareholders 
have the option of choosing to invest in whichever form of contract they believe suits 
their specific acceptable combination of risk and reward.  In addition, shareholders are 
granted several special remedies at law, such as derivative actions and winding-up the 
company on just and equitable grounds, denied to other stakeholders.105 Finally, as a 
previously noted, in a stock market with much liquidity, there is always the exit option.
The shareholder primacy model has a number of other fundamental problems to which 
we will now turn.  Shareholder primacy focuses on wealth maximization.  This leads to 
the question, what is wealth maximization? Is it shareholder wealth, or is it corporate 
profit?  In a groundbreaking study, Professor Hu has identified a significant difference 
between shareholder gain and corporate profit and particularly, that the one does not 
corporate profitability other than wish for it. “To Whom it May Concern: Fiduciary Duties and Business 
Associations,”  (2001) 26 Del. J. Corp. L 515.
105
 There is discussion in both Canadian and Ontario corporate law concerning the meaning and 
applicability of oppression remedies which may be available to non-shareholders.
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necessarily lead to the other.106  This fact creates a problem for managers who on the one 
hand seek job security by having employment with a wealthy corporation while on the 
other hand remaining answerable to shareholders seeking their own wealth.107
In addition, Hu has identified and analysed the myth of the common shareholder interest.  
He notes a number of conflicts existing as between shareholders.  For example, 
shareholders disagree concerning the nature and amount of risk each wants the 
management to take, they have different time lines—whether long term capital gain, or 
speculators trying to take advantage of an acquisition announcement.108  This critique 
leaves shareholder theorists subject to the same attack they level at stakeholders: there is 
evidently more than one objective and managers cannot focus on more than one 
objective.  In this instance the objectives include corporate profit, shareholder wealth, 
short-term shareholder interests, long term shareholder interests, high-risk shareholder 
interests, and low risk shareholder interests, among others.  Worse yet, the law has
neither denied nor validated one shareholder over the other.109  At this point, the law 
106
 H. Hu, op cit, discussed in Orts 1588-91.
107
 Various commentators have noted the undercapitalization of USA corporations where directors under 
pressure from shareholders have taken too much money out of the corporation harming its long term 
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Corfield, p. 215, n. 8.
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introduces yet another guidepost, namely, “the best interests of the corporation”110  which 
tends to further confound the discussion.
But this brings us to the more fundamental question of why shareholders should have 
their privileged position in the first place.  Dine raises the question from the dynamic 
aspect of the corporation.  As noted previously, while shareholders are necessary to start 
up or found the corporation and claim primacy on that basis, from an operational 
perspective once the corporation is up and running, their role as founders loses 
significance.  This foundational argument is even more seriously challenged by the 
practice among lawyers of having “shelf-companies”, companies organized and 
registered for the purpose of rapid and easy deployment of a corporate vehicle in a 
commercial transaction.  Once the business corporation is operational, shareholders are 
but one more source of capital, and in truth, the least preferred source of capital.111  From 
an operational perspective therefore, shareholders really have no privileged position or 
interest.112  In fact, were it not for their voting power, their existence would be but of 
marginal interest.113  In a related vein, shareholder primacy theorists argue that because 
shareholders are true insiders because they are founders.  Hill’s study of corporations 
raises serious questions about the insider-outsider model of the corporation, and 
particularly, shareholder claims to primacy based on their special role as the ultimate 
110
 Sommer op cit p. 51at pp. 46-51.
111
 Hill, Public, p. 4, n. 37, 38, & 39.
112
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113
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insider.  As previously noted from the perspective of corporate finance, Hill’s analysis 
suggests that other traditional outsider financiers often play a much greater insider role 
than shareholders.114  In addition, as we have seen the demarcation lines between debt 
and equity have been sufficiently eroded to make it nearly impossible to ascribe one party 
“insider rights” to denied to the other “outsiders “ on the basis of this debt-equity 
distinction.  Further on this insider-outsider theme it is difficult to see how such 
employees should be outsiders without some determinative power over the direction of 
the corporation while day-trading shareholders should be considered insiders with such 
power. 115
Horrigan criticizes the shareholder primacy approach to capital.  He observes that this 
definition of capital in this model is too narrow or “monodimensional.”  Corporate 
enterprise as a type of human enterprise relies on “economic capital, human capital, 
intellectual capital, social capital and environmental capital.”116 In reality, shareholders 
are just one type of capital provider among a vast collection of providers including 
114
 Ibid. p. 2
115
 Summers, “Codetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials” (1982) 4 J 
Comp. Corp L & Sec Reg 155. cited in Hill, Public.  Shareholder theory relies on strong sense of private 
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employees who provide human capital, creditors who provide debt capital, suppliers and 
society that provides educated, assimilated workers.117
Returning to the property rights argument for shareholder primacy, Hill points out that 
the early aggregate or partnership model of the corporation supported the view of 
shareholders as “owners” of the enterprise, and hence their importance rested on the idea 
that their interests are “distinct and inherently different” from other parties.  But as we 
have seen, the history of the corporation has moved it and the associated rights a 
considerable distance from these roots.  From a legal perspective 118 shareholders are not 
“owners” of the corporation and accordingly, this argument fails.  Further, as Stout 
observes, options theory undermines at a most fundamental level the notion of 
shareholder ownership.119
Replies to Shareholder Primacy Criticism and Further Criticism
117
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If, then, shareholders are not dominant in management, control or in terms of providing 
finance, why should they continue to have the level of control they do?  Why should they 
have the vote?120
In essence, the shareholder primacy theory is based on assumptions of efficiency.  With 
one goal—wealth generation—managers will be clear on their objective and do what they 
are able to do, best—generate wealth.  It is less efficient to have the corporation involved 
such other social concerns such as the just distribution of wealth, a takes for which it was 
not designed.  General social welfare is outside the scope of corporate concern.  
Externalised costs are acceptable in the creation of wealth as they are of minimal concern 
to non-shareholders, and where they do become of concern, it is the role and 
responsibility of other societal organizations, such as government, to address them, or 
these non-shareholders to contract for those harms.  
The argument has been advanced that perhaps shareholders should enjoy these rights to 
cause some general harm in the process of their wealth maximization on the basis that 
they value them more than non-shareholders value the right not to be harmed.  Millon 
observes that at a factual level, non-shareholders tend to suffer more from shareholder 
exploitation than shareholders would if they were not permitted the right.121 Further, 
120
 As noted earlier, Wood argues shareholders gave up these rights when they surrendered responsibility 
for the corporation. 
121
 Millon, New Directions, p. 1384.
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Millon questions why bargaining and bargaining power should be the basis of protection 
from the harmful effects of shareholder wealth maximization.122
A further criticism of shareholder primacy comes from the nature of shareholders 
themselves.  Shareholders are by and large passive. As Hill observes, “[shareholders] 
invest in the investment, not in the corporation.”123  They are not interested in building, 
operating, or controlling the corporation.  When problems in the corporation become 
evident, shareholders prefer to exercise exit rights—the Wall Street walk—over working 
to resolving the situation.124
There are as well some obvious factual arguments against shareholder primacy.  Contrary 
to their claim that the stakeholder corporations cannot function because of diverse 
objectives, in many places the law has successfully and without undue diminution of 
122
 As Millon puts it,  “one might argue that shareholders should enjoy this right because they value it more 
highly than nonshareholders would value a property right not to be harmed”. One response is to question 
the validity of the factual assertion. Many nonshareholders lose far more from shareholder exploitation of 
nonshareholder vulnerability than would shareholders if such opportunities were impeded. If an entitlement 
were with nonshareholders, shareholders would presumably sustain a somewhat lower rate of return on 
their investments (unless job security and other protections actually resulted in heightened productivity). In 
contrast, as long as the entitlement is with the shareholders, workers, for example…” Frontiers p. 1380.
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 Hill. Visions, quoting Buxbaum, Institutional Owners and Corporate Managers: A Comparative 
Perspective,” 57 Brooklyn LR 1 28-29
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 Farrar CG, 13. but note also that shareholders are unlikely to expend the effort to get involved to resolve 
these problems as management per se is not likely to be their area of expertise and furthermore, there is the 
disincentive of the free-rider problem. CG, p. 325.
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wealth—shareholder or societal—integrated stakeholder theory.  Whether one chooses to 
look at European corporations with their two tiered boards, or employee, creditor, 
environmental liabilities placed on directors in Anglo modelled corporations, one finds 
that directors have successfully incorporated the conflicting concerns of their various 
constituent stakeholders in the supposedly exclusive shareholder model.125   One study 
indicates that managers understand the different objectives demanded by the difference 
between shareholder value and traditional accounting have adapted their behaviour 
accordingly.126
Further, shareholder primacy theorist tends to ignore empirical studies demonstrating the 
success of stakeholder oriented corporations.127  In reality, even in the USA, arguably the 
most shareholder primacy jurisdiction, the law permits considerable latitude to 
management to deviate from shareholder primacy.128  Even among shareholder primacy 
advocates themselves, one notes levels of deviation from shareholder primacy.  Whether 
one notes Friedman’s caveat restricting shareholder wealth maximization to “conforming 
125
 See Wood op cit for his interesting explanation of Langtry’s  “Tinged Stakeholder theory”. 
126
 See, M. Useem, “Executive Defence: Shareholder Power and Corporate Reorganization” 4-5, 10-11 
(1993)  cited in Orts, p. 1589-90.
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 See for example, M. Omran and J. Pointon, “Shareholders versus Stakeholders: Corporate Mission 
Statements and Investor Returns.” (Oct. 2002), 11 Business Ethics: A European Review, 4, p. 318. and a 5 
year longitudinal study of companies on the FTSE unpublished presented at EBEN conference Cambridge, 
England, April 6-8, 2003.
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 Dunfee, p. 8. contested by Sommer who views the latitude to be limited to long-term shareholder 
interest. Blumberg “The American Law of Corporate Groups” argues contrary cited in Dine GCG p. 59
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to the basic rules of society”129, Jensen’s concern for “equity, creditors, warrant holders,” 
or Hansmann and Kraakman, move away from pure shareholder interests granting 
“creditors, to be sure, are to some degree an exception”130 (with no reason for the 
exception), it suggests that shareholder supremacy is in some way unsatisfactory even to 
its most outspoken advocates.  It suggests that these advocates recognize, as others have 
noted, that the corporation exists within society and relies on the social goods or capital 
supplied by society.131
From the above discussion, it is clear that the debate is complex and difficult, if not 
impossible, to resolve within the parameters of the debate itself.  If one is to move 
forward one must step outside the narrow confines of the debate and address directly the 
ideological and technical considerations underlying the tensions.  From an ideological 
perspective, one compares the neoliberal economics focus on private property, anti-
regulatory stance with the social justice concerns of more socialist oriented scholars.132
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 Dunfee observes that Friedman’s meaning is ambiguous and the statement open to both broad and 
narrow interpretation pp. 9-10
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 To avoid a digression into this complex discussion, I will simply note the comment of  R. Malloy 
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These two opposing stances translate into the discussion of nature and purpose of the 
corporation and from whence, the nature and purpose of corporate law.  It is from such an 
understanding that the four questions of corporate governance can be answered.
MODELS OF THE CORPORATION AND THE DEBATE133
Models of the corporation are intimately connected to the debate.  As we shall see, one 
level the whole shareholder-stakeholder debate hinges on what one’s theory of the 
corporation is.  Models are both a starting point and a conclusion for the various 
positions. Briefly, if one adopts the model of the corporation as a series of private 
contracts between individuals, there can be no discussion about any interest but 
shareholder interests.  If, however, one adopts the model of the corporation as a 
concession from society, then one may rightly claim corporate obligations back to 
society.   In this section we will briefly examine the various models of the corporation 
and the significance of models for the debate.134  Broadly speaking, there are three main 
Cambridge University Press. P.1 Malloy views the issue not as a tension between efficiency and social 
justice.  Rather, on the basis of the application of semiotic theory to the problem, Malloy frames the issues 
as a dynamic between creativity and efficiency.  Unfortunately, his set of solutions are beyond the scope of 
this paper’s analysis of the traditional stakeholder-shareholder debate.
133
 This analysis relies heavily on Dine GCG, pp. 3-28, and Bottomley, From Contractualism.
134
 Millon, writes, “A standard argumentative move in these debates has been the effort to justify a position 
for or against legal reform by reference to some kind of characterization of the corporate person.  A 
descriptive assertion (“the corporation is x”) is advanced on behalf of a normative claim (“therefore y 
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models of the corporation.  These are: concessionaire and contractarian which roughly 
approximate the entity, social models for the former and the aggregational, property 
models for the latter and—the third model of the corporation, the communitarian model, 
will not be dealt with because it has largely been abandoned with the decline of state-run 
corporations.135
Contractarian Theories136
In essence, contractarians view the corporation as a form of contract between 
shareholders.  This theory posits the corporation as a private matter between individuals 
thus placing no additional duty on the corporation than that which exists on the separate 
individuals involved in the corporation.  The corporation as a private matter should be 
subject to the least possible government interference.  There are two types of 
contractarians—legal and economic.137
should follow”).  In this way, what might otherwise appear to be abstract, purely academic debates about 
corporate legal theory in fact support controversial political agendas.” The Ambiguous, p. 2.
135
 Some Authors see the debate as communitarians versus contractarians.  Se for example, Millon, New 
Directions in which, he loosely ties communitarians to concessionaire views.  Other, describes the models 
in terms  of property versus entity.  See for example, W. Allen. “Our Schizophrenic Conception of the 
Business Corporation” 14 Cardozo L.R.  261, noted in Stout p. 1190 n. 6
136
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Legal Contractarian Model
Legal contractarianism is the view that corporations arise when two or more people come 
together, to form a legal contract to carry on commercial activity.  From Bottomley’s 
discussion, we may note three aspects of legal contractualism, relevant to this discussion.  
First, it creates a legal entity in which directors and members are bound together in the 
corporation’s articles of incorporation.  Second, it defines the boundaries and 
membership of the corporation.138  And third, it favours the overall interest of the 
members over the interest of any individual.139  It is, to say the least an “unusual type” of 
contract.140
The model’s weakness lies in interpretation of the corporation’s founding articles or 
constitution.  The “founding contract” is only enforceable by shareholders despite the fact 
that other parties may be party to the contract and even then, shareholder legal remedies 
are greatly restricted.   
A further problem is that the model posits the interests of the founding contractors as 
being identical to the corporate enterprise itself.  As seen in the above discussion of the 
theories of Professor Hu, this is simply not the case.  Corporate interests differ from 
shareholders' as do shareholders among themselves.
138
 p.283
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As previously noted, Dine identifies the difficulty in applying this foundational model to 
an operating company: once up and running, the rights and duties of the parties in a 
corporation change—the shareholders no longer have the absolute rights they had when 
founding the corporation, and in particular, their rights vis-à-vis directors are weakened.  
As demonstrated in Foss v. Harbottle,141 the directors have independence from the 
shareholders and a level of immunity from shareholders even should the directors take an 
action contrary to the wishes of some shareholders.  This suggests that the corporation is 
more than a mere contract between shareholders.
Economic Contractarian Model
This model finds its origins with the economist Ronald Coase.  Coase first proposed that 
the corporation is a type of firm.142  By this Coase means that the firm operates as a more 
efficient means of production by grouping people and inputs together, combining tasks in 
one enterprise thereby lowering transaction costs.143  In this model, there is a direct 
connection and related accountability between the capital provider-shareholders and the 
managers.  As Friedman puts it “He [an executive] has a direct responsibility to his 
141
 (1843) 2 Hare 461 in which case the court in its examination of minority shareholder rights determined 
that the appropriate party to take action against directors is the corporation itself. Farrar CG, p. 171.
142
 Op cit n. 9.
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 Coase op. cit discussed as the source of the 1980’s nexus of contracts theorists in Millon, New Frontiers, 
pp. 229-232. This issue for economic contractarians is:  How the owner-shareholder principal can control 
and limit the manager-agent sufficiently to minimize “managerial opportunism” or “agency costs”.  They 
find answers in the markets for capital, corporate control and management skill, and secondarily in the 
body of corporate law.  Bottomley, From Contractualism pp. 285-287
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employers.  That responsibility is to conduct the business in accordance to their desire, 
which generally will be to make as much money as possible.”144
Contractarians reject the notion of the corporation being a body independent of the 
shareholders and in fact reject the very idea of corporation.  It is merely a nexus of 
contracts.  Logically, it cannot have obligations distinct from the obligations of its 
individual members.  Therefore, the notion of corporate social responsibility as distinct 
from the responsibilities of the individual shareholders, is a non-sequitor.  It is simply a 
logical contradiction. 
Clearly, as Millon observes, the contractarians model favour shareholder primacy.  In his 
words, contractarians
state corporate law provides the terms of the contract by which shareholders 
purchase management's undivided loyalty to their welfare… to the extent that 
management's pursuit of shareholder welfare threatens nonshareholder interests, 
workers, creditors, and other affected nonshareholders are free to bargain with 
shareholders (through their agents) for whatever protections they are willing to 
pay for.  This view assumes that feasible (that is, not excessively costly) 
contracting strategies exist for correction of the harmful external effects of 
shareholder/management activity and, perhaps, that such effects are relatively 
uncommon.145
The contractarian model has number of shortcomings.  Critically, it fails to explain the 
most significant feature of the corporation: that is to say it does not account for limited 
144
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liability.146  Nor do contractarian models adequately address other corporate rights such 
as the right to hold property and the right to freedom of expression, which rights are held 
independently of its members.
The univocal focus on efficiency147 supported by contractarian models brings the 
question of why efficiency should be set as the prime value.  As Millon observes: 
“References to efficiency simply beg the underlying question of why efficiency should 
provide the sole normative criterion.  As a society we have not embraced the market as a 
totalizing model for the definition of rights and responsibilities.”148 Furthermore, this 
146
 Dine notes the state involvement in creating the limited liability aspect of corporations.  This grant of 
limited liability is what made corporations such an attractive option for conducting business (Eley v. 
Positive Government Life Assurance (1876) 1 ExD 88,) and essentially what gave rise to their dominance 
in commerce. GCG p. 4.  The explanation that this would eventually have been contracted for, according to 
Dine, is not supported by the facts.
147 Contractarians’ efficiency focus follows closely on the economists’ view that creating wealth is the sole 
objective of corporate activity.  Any increase in wealth is a social benefit, and permits turning a blind eye to 
the distribution of that wealth or the costs of producing that wealth.  As Malloy points out, Kaldor-Hicks 
theorem suggests that as long as there is an overall net gain in a transaction, regardless of the size of the 
loss sustained by any party, the parties should be coerced into the transaction for the benefit of the overall 
gain.  This position seems to undermine some of the fundamentals of property rights on which 
contractarians base their arguments.  Dine observes that in the contractarians model, the role of government 
is to correct market failure, to create a more perfect market.  The idea of the economic contractualists is that 
allocation efficiency will be best achieved by permitting the market to adjust supply, demand and costs 
with the least interference.  
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 New Directions, p. 1386.
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focus on the bottom line always creates a strong incentive to externalize costs, increase 
production, and thereby increase profit.149  As Horrigan observes:
financially based shareholder focus… allows corporations to externalize the costs 
of maximizing stock prices onto everyone except the stockholders’ the includes 
employees, the environment, consumers, suppliers and the community at large.150
Contractarians are focused on internal corporate activity and apply a cost--benefit 
analysis to a relatively narrow range of items that are more easily subject to numeric 
measurement.
A further criticism of this view is how it explains the one-person corporation where the 
shareholder is also the director.  How can one contract with oneself?  The legal answer to 
this question, of course, comes from the case of Salomon mentioned previously.151
Thus, generally it may be stated that shareholder primacy advocates support and argue 
from a contractarian model.152
Concession Theories
Concession theorists note that corporate existence owes its origins to a governmental 
concession.  In the beginning, governments delegated and granted trading rights to 
149
 See Kaldor-Hicks theory discussed op cit. Also, Kaldor-Hicks as discussed in Dine, p. 9 and Malloy p. 
154-155.
150
 Horrigan, p. 550.
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 Interestingly, Rawls uses a contractarian model to argue for a different result.  Noted in Millon, New 
Directions, n. 19.
50
corporations.153  Corporations were permitted to carry on only those activities authorized 
in the concession granted by the government.  The limits of the concession were set out 
in the articles of incorporation or constitution of the corporation.  Given this 
concessionary nature of the corporation, the government retained certain rights 
concerning the governance and operation of the corporation.  Further, as Bottomley 
argues, “[corporations] themselves are systems in which power and authority, rights and 
obligations, duties and expectation, benefits and disadvantages, are allocated and 
exercised….  Each company is a body politic…”154 If one accepts this view of the 
corporation, its is easier to see the argument for stakeholder involvement or are least for 
government regulation.  As a governmental concession, it owes duties back to the 
government.  This obligation, however, does not extend automatically, to society.155
Dine observes that the concessionaire view is susceptible to the criticism that the 
corporation is no more than a mere fiction.156  If it is not made up of the solid, physical 
shareholders, acting in concert to create a common enterprise, the corporation has no 
more substance than a mere idea.  Further, while it may explain the foundation of the 
corporation, concession theory fails as an operational theory.  It does not explain by 
whom or how the corporation is to be run.  Nor yet does it set any limits on state 
153
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involvement.  Indeed a pure concession view allows the corporation to be a mere 
instrument of the state.  157
Models by definition are inadequate representations of the thing they attempt to 
represent.  In the context of corporate law, this limitation of models is exacerbated by the 
complexity of the subject.  He goes on to observe: 
To say "corporation" is not like saying "chair" or "dog." The reality to which 
"corporation" refers is more complex than an easily identifiable material thing or 
animal, and any attempt to force a preconceived theory on a complex legal reality 
results in what Hart calls "contrivances varying with tastes."  The idea of the 
corporation is complex precisely because it involves various relationships that 
presuppose the rules and principles, and methods of enforcement and compliance 
that compose a legal system.158
In fact, as Hart, notes: “a survey of competing theories of ‘the corporation’ leaves one to 
conclude that none has survived intact.”159
History and the Development of Models 
These models follow an historical development.  At the time of monarchical domination 
of trade, the concession theory most accurately reflected the state of affairs.  As well, the 
state’s involvement in the creation of corporations through such things as acts of 
legislature also lent weight to the argument for state involvement and enforcement of 
broader social interests.  With the development of the discipline of economics, the 
application of economic theory to law and the increasing interest in efficiency and its 
157
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158
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159
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relation to wealth creation, the contractarian models began to take shape and move into a 
position of prominence.  As the consequence of following this model of the corporation 
became clearer, the appropriateness of the model came into question and the theories of 
private property and the role of government in the market began to be re-examined.  This 
re-examination is particularly evident in legislation designed to mitigate costs to non-
shareholders in the market for corporate control.160  An understanding of the historical 
development of the corporation cannot lead one to any conclusion as to the correct or 
appropriate model of the corporation.
The Ideological Divide
Underlying this war of models is a much deeper ideological conflict.  Shareholder 
advocates start from the idea that people should be free to decide how to live including 
how they should dispose of their property.  As Millon puts it: “[they focus] on the 
individual as an autonomous being….  [and] human liberty as freedom from external, 
unconsented-to restraint.”  Stakeholder advocates, by contrast, view the individual as set 
in a context, and that context is a social context.  They view liberty as having positive 
duties.  From their perspective: “Liberty is empty without taking into account those 
160
 Summaries of the history of the corporation are readily available from a number of sources.  The above 
summary is based primarily on Millon, New Frontiers, pp. 205-220.  The history of corporate law follows 
more or less the same path in Anglo jurisdictions.  
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primary needs upon which adequate conceptions of individual dignity and human 
flourishing depend.”161
There are those who view the corporation as a social body.  These scholars view the 
corporation as a member of society, and a significant member at that.  They emphasize 
the power and effects of corporations in society.  In addition, they are, in Millon’s words, 
“skeptical about the practical efficacy of contract as a mechanism by which 
nonshareholders can protect themselves ex ante from… harmful effects.”162  There are 
those who view the corporation as a nexus of contracts between private individuals in 
which the government has no business and by which the greatest efficiency can be 
achieved.
As Millon frames the debate “what does set communitarians apart from contractarians is 
the communitarians' strong skepticism toward the baseline presumption that contract 
alone should specify the terms of corporate governance relationships.”163  At a 
fundamental ideological level, contractarians and communitarians are divided.  While 
contractarians believe that justice is manifest in the status quo and the only legitimate 
interests are those bargained for, as Millon puts it: 
161
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For communitarians, justice does not require endorsement of the existing 
distribution of wealth and bargaining capability.  They seek instead to reform 
corporate law so as to foster individual dignity and promote societal welfare.164
Such deep ideological debates are not about to be settled on the basis of superiority of 
models.165
A NORMATIVE COMMENT ON NATURE OF THE 
CORPORATION AND CORPORATE LAW
From the foregoing discourse it is evident that the shareholder-stakeholder debate cannot 
be resolved by looking at models nor the history of the corporation, or yet by looking at 
economics.  The economics focus on efficiency is fundamentally at odds with certain 
legal principles such as non-oppression of minorities, human rights and social justice.
164
 ibid 1386.  In Millon’s review of Chayes’s theories, he summarises the issue at a personal level: 
“Having induced nonshareholders to rely on legitimate expectations of fair dealing, shareholders therefore 
may forfeit the right to insist on contract terms guaranteeing profits at the expense of others.”  The 
Ambiguous, p. 23.
165 Dine’s suggestion, following Wolff, is an organic view, separating founding theories from operational 
theories where the former deal with the creating of the entity and the latter with the actual activities of the 
entity once it has been founded.  In this view, the corporation becomes the concern of those most intimately 
connected and affected by its operations and actions.  While this view certainly helps address the conflict 
between shareholder and stakeholder interest arguments, it does not resolve the conflict as to how to weigh 
different interests.  It does have the benefit, however, of keeping the corporation focused on commercial 
ends and not making it merely a state instrument and still permitting it to be responsive to broader societal 
concerns on which it undeniably has a significant effect.
55
To the extent that the shareholder-stakeholder debate can be resolved, at least for 
westerners, it may be by returning to first principles.  As Wood puts it: “In short, it [the 
duties of business] is a moral question—or more precisely an extra- or pre-legal question 
which typically involves complex practical and moral factors.”166  The eighteenth century 
British philosopher Edmund Burke observed: “The nature of man is intricate: the objects 
of society are of the greatest possible complexity; therefore no simple disposition or 
direction of power can be suitable, either to man’s nature, or the quality of his affairs.”167
In essence then, we must ask, what are the objectives of law in general, and of corporate 
law in particular.  This question needs to be answered as it is asked—in the two parts as 
to general and specifics.  From the general perspective, Justinian offers that the law ought 
to cause a man “to live honesty, not to harm another, and give each his due.”168
Reinterpreted by the modern legal philosopher, John Rawls,169 it can be said that justice 
in the distribution of society’s goods is fundamental to a just society.  Rawls observes 
“Society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage.”  He argues that we live in a 
world of limited resources, and that a just resolution to the conflicts concerning society’s 
distribution and use of resources is necessary to have a society in the first place.  This he 
states is society’s enabling condition.
166
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This view is reflected even in management literature.  As Vinten notes: “to have any 
defensible property rights at all, one must recognise a fundamental commitment to 
helping those in need.”170 Law’s proper role as concerning justice then is to support such 
a distribution.  Rawls suggests that equality of opportunity in that he sees the only way to 
prevent the stronger (or richer) in his just state from overpowering the weaker (or poorer) 
in enforcing the maxim.
This power of corporations has long been recognized: as to financial power in society, by 
Dodds, and as to more general influence on society at least since the 1950’s.  As noted by 
a legal scholar of that era: “‘the corporate organization of business have long ceased to be 
private phenomena.  That they have a direct impact on the social, economic, and political 
life of the nation is no longer a matter of argument.’”171 The current state of the law in 
Anglo countries, while permitting shareholder concerns to be overridden in certain 
circumstances, through constituency legislation and the business judgment rule, still 
places a heavy emphasis on shareholder primacy.172  In fact, directors who wish to 
include other stakeholders do so at their peril, both at law and in business.173  Judging by 
Rawls principles, this state of the law cannot be correct.
170
 Op cit. p. 380
171
 Friedmann, “Corporate Power, Governance by Private Groups, and the Law” (1957) 57 Columbia L. R. 
155, p. 176 noted in Millon, Frontiers, p. 226.
172
 See Sommer’s discussion pp. 39-46.
173
 Sommer, for example, comments: “only a reckless corporate advisor would permit board minutes, or an 
accurate rendering of the advice given a board to suggest that the board had put non-shareholder interests 
before those of shareholders.” Ibid., 
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On the level of the particular, one must ask and attempt to answer the question:  What is  
the purpose of corporate law?  The contractarian answer, that corporate law provides a set 
of off the shelf rules for the corporation can hardly be correct.  Nor yet can shareholder 
primacy theorists’ position of wealth maximization.   As Millon observes, “Neither in 
practice nor in law has society ever accepted the ruthless, single-minded pursuit of 
shareholder wealth maximization as a justified end in itself.”174
As seen from the previous discussion concerning the nature and models of the 
corporation, it is not a simple matter.  Indeed, as Professor Orts observes, reductionistic 
modelling is “not only unhelpful, but destructive.”175   The problem resulting from such 
simplification can be seen in the economic argument for shareholder primacy, namely, 
the betterment of society.  The argument runs as follows: By permitting the market to 
operate with the least restrictions, there will be the greatest possible efficiency, creating 
the most possible wealth, creating the greatest quantity of goods possible available to 
174
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1932, the orthodox assumption has been that corporate law's objective is to develop legal structures that 
will maximize shareholder wealth.  This shareholder primacy vision of corporate law therefore disregards 
claims of various nonshareholder constituencies (including employees, creditors, customers, suppliers, and 
communities in which firms operate) whose interests may be adversely affected by managerial pursuit of 
shareholder welfare.  Managerial accountability to shareholders is corporate law's central problem.  
Nonshareholder interests, if entitled to any legal protection at all, are for other, noncorporate law legal 
regimes.” New Directions, at p. 1374
Ibid., p. 1374.
175
 op cit p. 1565.
58
society.  In other words, by permitting the markets to operate with the highest level of 
efficiency—corporations focused exclusively on wealth production—the greatest social 
good will be achieved.176
Taking Hart’s rule based analysis Orts identify complexity results from corporate law’s 
normative conflicts.  He discusses the following conflicting norms. The divided 
economic object: profit vs. wealth, short vs. long term, central management vs. dispersed 
capital providers, capital accumulation, protection of investors, and the protection of 
other interests.  He then notes that following the law serves as an objective in itself 
referring to the thinking and terminology of Dean Clark who describes this as “modest 
idealism.” In such instances managers may cause a corporation to take a course of action 
that produces a lesser profit but complies with the law when non-compliance would be 
more profitable for the purpose of honouring the social-moral ideal of following the 
law.177  Finally, Orts notes the ethical dimension of corporate law that allows for the 
noneconomic considerations of ethics and justice.178  As Orts observes:  “policies 
underlying corporate law cannot be reduced to a unidimensional value, such as the 
economic objective of ‘maximizing shareholders' wealth’ or even, more generally, 
176
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‘economic efficiency.’” 179  But a discussion of normative corporate law should go 
beyond a mere distillation of principles and objects in the particular area of law.
Millon posits four norms for corporate law.  He suggests that it should (1) promote stable 
relations between certain non-shareholder constituencies and the corporation, (2) adjust 
the gains between shareholders and non-shareholders, (3) address the fairness in 
allocation of transaction costs, and (4) look for ways to include in decision making those 
most directly effected by such decisions.180  Orts adds, “Corporate law, like most law, is 
primarily about the rule--oriented structuring of social power, and it is specifically about 
the rules that structure the organization of economic power.”181   Following Rawls, 
therefore, a strong argument can be made that corporate law should include access to 
power by non-shareholders.182  By such standards, Australia’s CLERP objectives:  
Market Freedom, Investor Protection, Information Transparency, Cost Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Neutrality and flexibility, Business Ethics and Compliance appear 
inadequate.183
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Corporate law, like all law, should have as its purpose the betterment of society.  Farrar 
takes the position that the fundamental tenet of corporate law, the independent legal 
entity doctrine, is fundamentally flawed and fails to meet or promote any of the three 
criteria advocated by Justinian.184  Wood notes that the effect of limited liability is to pass 
on the costs of business failure to others, and in the collapse of a big firm, a multitude of 
smaller victims or involuntary stakeholders.185  Corporate law that permits and promotes 
the on-going externalisation of business costs is contrary to the fundamental principles of 
justice.186  Shareholder primacy creates another problem in situations where hyper norms 
are involved.  Such norms, argues Dunfee, “serve to judge, and if necessary to invalidate, 
local laws and local morality…. [they] entail principles… fundamental to human 
existence”.187
The effect of current corporate law emphasizing shareholder interests is just the opposite. 
Recent computer modelling of the current free market economic model suggests that this 
concentration will increase, not decrease.188 This trend of increasing concentration of 
wealth suggests that a more fundamental modification to corporate law is called for. 
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Corporate law that permits and promotes increased inequalities between members of 
society too is fundamentally flawed for the reason that it contradicts the basic principles 
of justice.  Admittedly, the distributive aspect could be dealt with through tax law; 
however, the fact that current Anglo corporate law with its heavy shareholder focus tends 
to exacerbate social inequalities, both political and economic suggests that a profound re-
examination of corporate law and corporate law reform is well overdue.
It is unsupportable that corporations which, as Dine points out,
account for most of the world’s industrial capacity, technological knowledge and 
international financial transactions… mine, refine and distribute most of the 
world’s oil,… extract most of the world’s minerals… harvest much of the world’s 
wood… grow many of the world’s agricultural crops, while processing and 
distributing much of its food… hold 90 per cent of all technology and product 
patents worldwide and are involved in 70 percent of world trade189
should be only answerable to those relatively few who have the wealth to be 
shareholders.190
CONCLUSION
The shareholder-stakeholder debate is a highly complex, multi-faceted, interdisciplinary 
debate.  As such it cannot be answered easily or completely.  As Wood observes 
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Concerning the shareholder conception, the weakness is moral and the strength 
practical; in the case of the stakeholder conception, the position is reversed.  The 
shareholder conception therefore stands… in need of moral rehabilitation, and the 
stakeholder conception in need of practical rehabilitation.191
From the perspective of this author the broader perspective of the role of the corporation 
in society seems to be the more realistic, logical perspective.  If one takes that to be the 
better position, let us briefly put the four answers to the four questions of corporate 
governance.
What is the entity being governed? A combined answer looking at legal, economic, social 
and dynamic aspects may serve us best.  One such definition is offered by Clarkson who 
writes: ‘‘‘The Firm’ is a system of stake holders operating within the larger system of the 
host society that provides the necessary legal an market infrastructure for the firm’s 
activities.  The purpose of the firm is to create wealth or value for its stake holders by 
converting their stake into goods and services.”192
By whom it should be governed?  I would suggest that it be governed by a multi-tiered 
board including other stakeholders.  This suggestion is not impractical as can be seen by 
the relative efficacy of other stakeholder models of boards, such as the German model.  
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What is the best way to govern it?  By permitting the corporation to pursue its 
commercial ends within more broadly drafted corporate statutes mandating a broader 
range of interests and integrating into the governance structure people whose interests 
more broadly represent the community of stakeholders effected by the corporation a 
corporation can be well governed.  The disclosure requirements of shareholder theory 
should be kept, but the accounting amplified to include “triple bottom line” or “quadruple 
bottom line” regimes.
And finally, in whose interests should the entity be governed?  Given the great impact of 
corporations on society, the narrow shareholder primacy view advocating the operation of 
corporations for the exclusive interests of people with sufficient wealth to be shareholders 
can no longer be supported.  Corporations must be run for the benefit of society.  While 
not supporting a model where corporations are merely instruments of the state, these 
entities must be run for the broader interests of society. 
Horrigan offers an interesting criticism of the whole shareholder-stakeholder debate.  He 
focuses on what he believes is the falsely dichotomous structure of the debate and 
suggests that a reframing of the issue, as the effective functioning of different elements of 
society would serve all interests best.193
Perhaps the best way to express this view as an aspiration for corporate law can be found 
in the words of Orts: 
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Wise policy makers… should not convert the framework of corporate law into 
either an unfeeling gauntlet of economic madness nor an overly sanguine vision 
of do--good business. New directions in corporate law should instead take society 
on a course that is morally and politically uplifting, as well as economically 
productive.194
The current growing stakeholder views may permit us to limit the externalising of social 
and environmental costs done in favour of maximizing shareholder wealth and ultimately 
save our planet from destruction, permitting us to say with Scrooge, the reluctant 
stakeholder: “the shadows of the things that would have been, may be dispelled.”195
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